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PRACTICE .AND PnoCEDuRB-THIRD-P.ARTY PRAcnCE-StmROGATJ;ON .AND CoN-

lNJURIES-A brought an action against B for injuries suffered in an automobile
accident and aggravation of those injuries by the negligent treatment of a physician, D. B filed a third-party complaint against D for malpractice contending
that D was liable over to him for all or a part of the judgment recovered by A.
D's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint for want of a sufficient cause of
action was denied. On appeal, held, affirmed. A tort-feasor who has been held
liable for injuries is subrogated to any right of action which the injured party
may have had against a physician for malpractice. On the second trial the physician will not be bound by the original judgment and may litigate the issue of the
alleged wrongdoer's liability as well as that of the charge of malpractice. Clark v.
Halstead,. Wheeler v. Blash, (N.Y. 1949) 93 N.Y.S. (2d) 49.
The contribution statute of New York1 provides for contribution in the
event that the plaintiff recovers a joint judgment against tort-feasors. Thus a
substantive right of the defendant is in many instances placed in the hands of
the plaintiff who can work the defendant irreparable harm simply by refusing
to join the party from whom the defendant could seek reparation. 2 The principal case presents a possible alternative to contribution which will permit the
defendant, either in a separate action, or by use of impleader, to recover against
one who should bear a partial share of the damages suffered by the plaintiff. It
is clear that the person causing the initial injury is liable for the aggravation of
the injury due to the negligence of a doctor.3 However, the doctor is liable as
well and the plaintiff may sue either of the tort-feasors or both of them.4 A release of the initial tort-feasor without a reservation of rights against the doctor is
a release of him also, for a full recovery is presumed. 5 The courts approve this
TRIBUTION-lliGHT OF DEFENDANT TO JOIN PHYSICIAN WHO AGGRAVATED

1 N.Y.C.P.A. §21la. It was held in Fox v. Western N.Y. Motor Lines, 257 N.Y. 305,
178 N.E. 289 (1931), that a defendant cannot implead a joint tort-feasor because of this
contribution law although broad provisions are made for the impleading of parties who
would be liable over to the principal defendant under N.Y.C.P.A. §193.
2 For a criticism of this result of the New York law see Gregory, "Tort Contribution
Practice in New York," 20 CoRN. L.Q. 269 (1935).
3 See cases collected in 8 AL.R. 506 (1920). The reason for holding the initial tortfeasor liable for the aggravation is that his action is deemed to be. the proximate cause of the
aggravation.
4 4 ToRTs RESTATEMENT §879 (1939).
5 Martin v. Cunningham, 93 Wash. 517, 161 P. 355 (1916); and Pitkin v. Chapman,
121 Misc. 88, 200 N.Y.S. 235 (1923). See also 50 A.L.R. 1108 (1927) and 30 MICH. L.
REv. 1349 (1932).
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last mentioned result even though it is generally only with respect to joint liability that a release of one tort-feasor operates as a release of the others.6 The
theory adopted by the courts is that the initial injury and the aggravation constitute a single injury caused by separate torts which give rise to several liability
as to the aggravation. Thus if the initial tort-feasor is held accountable for the
total injuries to the plaintiff, the courts do not feel that as against the doctor he is
justly chargeable with the damages arising from the aggravation. 7 Therefore it is
not surprising that a theory of subrogation has been developed which permits the
initial tort-feasor to implead the doctor in the principal action, or to start a
separate action against him for the amount of damages which accrued from the
aggravation. 8 Thus through the medium of subrogation a just result may be obtained which might otherwise be impossible in view of contribution statutes like
that in New York.
Richard B. Gushee, S.Ed.

6 4 TORTS RllsTATEMENT §885 (1939).
1 See Fisher v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. &

Light Co., 173 Wis. 57, 180 N.W. 269
(1920); Retelle v. Sullivan, 191 Wis. 576, 211 N.W. 756 (1927); and Bost v. Metcalfe,
219 N.C. 607, 14 S.E. (2d) 648 (1941).
8In 50 AM. JUR., Subrogation, §37, the subrogation of the initial tort-feasor to the
rights of the plaintiff against the physician is stated to be an exception to the general rule
that subrogation is not given to relieve one from the consequences of his own wrongful act.

